Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships.

Lahno, Bernd

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Peer reviewed

ERIC Number: EJ514470

Record Type: CIJE

Publication Date: 1995

Pages: N/A

Abstractor: N/A

ISBN: N/A

ISSN: ISSN-0022-0027

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Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships.

Lahno, Bernd

Journal of Conflict Resolution, v39 n3 p495-510 Sep 1995

Contrary to assumptions of the supergame model, agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed about past behavior of their partners. Moreover, they will generally be in a position to choose their partners. The formal model of this article, reputation formation, attempts to take account of these facts. (JBJ)

Descriptors: Cooperation, Educational Games, Interpersonal Relationship, Mathematical Models, Models, Power Structure, Prediction, Reputation, Rewards, Risk, Social Exchange Theory, Trust (Psychology)

Publication Type: Information Analyses; Journal Articles

Education Level: N/A

Audience: N/A

Language: English

Sponsor: N/A

Authoring Institution: N/A

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Author Affiliations: N/A