In this paper, the authors seek to establish the way in which young people are subject to two forms of epistemic oppression in testimony, what Dotson calls testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. Testimonial quieting happens when a hearer fails to identify a speaker as a person who knows about whatever subject about which the speaker is offering testimony (Dotson, "Tracking Epistemic Violence" 242), and testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker stifles their own testimony to avoid being the object of prejudice or ridicule on the part of hearers (244). The authors also consider how young people are subject to what Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when a group is less able to make sense of their experiences due to an imbalance of social power. This article examines three different scenarios of quieting: quieting of Parkland activists following a shooting at their school; quieting of Dream Defenders and Black Lives Matter activists following the shooting death of Trayvon Martin; and quieting of climate activists. Because of the different ways these groups were quieted, the authors consider the importance of analyses attentive to how race and other identity factors intersect with age to compound the epistemic oppression faced by young people. The authors then argue that Philosophy for Children (P4C) can help remedy epistemic oppression by helping young people who might otherwise stifle their testimony develop their voices, helping adult facilitators better listen to young people as equal interlocutors, and helping young people become adults who are less likely to quiet the testimony of any specific group in public discourse or elsewhere.