This dissertation project explores the research question of whether or not legislators in democracies act on their own genuine pro-trade preferences. For several decades, the International Political Economy literature has been dominated by an assumption that legislators, particularly in democracies, are merely conduits for the preferences of voters and special interests. In light of recent empirical data implying the fallibility of this assumption, scholars lack good alternative explanations for determinants of trade policy, particularly in explaining why democracies tend to have a more open trade policy than their non-democratic counterparts. I offer one alternative explanation by exploring the contexts under which legislators in democracies act on their own personal trade preferences in crafting trade policy. I argue that higher education -- and in many circumstances, a specific field of study -- socializes the pro-trade preferences that they act on in their legislative voting. The theory is tested on a quantitative case study of the U.S. Congress, both the House and the Senate, from the 100th to 115th Congress. While I find that a college degree is positively correlated with pro-trade voting, possessing an Economics degree is particularly influential, especially in smaller districts where protectionist constituency pressures are higher and a stronger pro-trade preference is required for the legislator to overcome those constraints. The findings are robust to other explanations such as party, ideology, district unemployment rates and income levels, and industry employment in sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and finance. [The dissertation citations contained here are published with the permission of ProQuest LLC. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. Copies of dissertations may be obtained by Telephone (800) 1-800-521-0600. Web page: http://www.proquest.com.bibliotheek.ehb.be/en-US/products/dissertations/individuals.shtml.]