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ERIC Number: ED510488
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2008-Nov
Pages: 3
Abstractor: ERIC
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
EISSN: N/A
Available Date: N/A
From Data to Bonuses: A Case Study of the Issues Related to Awarding Teachers Pay on the Basis of Their Students' Progress. Research Brief
National Center on Performance Incentives
In "From Data to Bonuses: A Case Study of the Issues Related to Awarding Teachers Pay on the Basis of their Students' Progress"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Daniel McCaffrey, Bing Han, and J.R. Lockwood of the RAND Corporation discuss the complex process of designing a system to award teacher bonuses on the basis of student achievement results. Using a case study approach, the authors recount the step-by-step decisions that accompany designing such a performance pay system for teachers: (1) creating a student achievement database; (2) choosing measures of teacher performance; and (3) establishing performance thresholds for awarding bonuses. The authors conclude that the process is challenging, and each decision may have profound implications for the motivating effect of the performance pay program. [This research brief describes work published by the National Center on Performance Incentives in "From Data to Bonuses: A Case Study of the Issues Related to Awarding Teachers Pay on the Basis of their Students' Progress," by Daniel McCaffrey, Bing Han, and J.R. Lockwood, Working Paper 2008-14.]
National Center on Performance Incentives. Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, PMB #43, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel: 615-322-5538; Fax: 615-322-6018; e-mail: ncpi@vanderbilt.edu; Web site: http://www.performanceincentives.org
Publication Type: Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: Vanderbilt University, National Center on Performance Incentives
IES Funded: Yes
Grant or Contract Numbers: R305A060034
Author Affiliations: N/A