This study is part of a larger research agenda, which includes future doctoral study, aiming to investigate the psychological processes of thought experiments. How do thought-experimenters establish relations between their imaginary worlds and the physical one? How does a technique devoid of new sensory input result to new empirical knowledge? In this study I investigate the following claims as possible answers: that intuition grounds the behaviour of an imaginary scenario in the experienced world; and that imagistic simulation provides the thought-experimenter with a quasi-perceptual analogue to direct perception through which they acquire novel empirical knowledge. Case methodology was adopted, the case being a pair of final year A-level physics students. Data was collected through non-participant observation over two sessions of collaborative problem-solving. The tasks drew upon Newtonian mechanics. A certain type of thought-experimental reasoning prevailed in the observation protocol. These thought experiments do not aim to induce unexpected results but to make intuitions about a situation experiencable in a concrete (imaginary) scenario. I interpret thought experiments of this type as a mental analogue to inductive discovery through physical experiment. A critical question for future research is whether all thought-experimental reasoning in general emulates physical experimentation, as the answer will potentially provide insights for exploring thought experimenting as an educable skill. [Appended are: (1) Paradigmatic Cases of TES; (2) The Tasks; (3) Transcripts; and (4) Letter Requesting Access. Thesis Presented for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Educational Research.]