In June 1986, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released its "Report and Order" and its "Third Computer Inquiry," which proposed to remove the then-current requirement that AT&T and the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) provide enhanced services only through separate subsidiaries. Instead, AT&T and the BOCs would be subject to several nonstructural safeguards. The order continued the legal distinction between regulated basic telecommunications and unregulated enhanced communications, but it established two primary safeguards--cost accounting and improved interconnection--to replace the separate subsidiary requirement. This paper discusses two kinds of improved interconnection in relation to the FCC ruling: Comparably Efficient Interconnection (CEI) and implementation of an Open Network Architecture (ONA). The importance of open networks in communications regulation is described, and observations are made on the ONA process. Contentious issues in the ONA process--including confusion and distrust, uniformity, and state/federal conflict--and general conclusions on ONA are outlined. It is argued that the FCC ordered improved interconnection between the BOC networks and the enhanced services industry in order to better the public interest; that improved interconnection is a tool for achieving competitive equality between the BOCs and the enhanced service providers; and that the risk taken by the FCC with its ONA rules are slight compared to the potential reward. (GL)