This paper explores the issue of sex bias in a contemporary major theory of moral development, cognitive moral theory. It explains critical reactions by Carol Gilligan and others questioning whether cognitive moral theory adequately accounts for female moral reasoning and behavior in its theory and research procedures. Several general characteristics of moral responsiveness that reflect observations of differences in how men and women construct the relation between self and others--formulated by Gilligan and Lyons--are included. The paper summarizes and evaluates the responses to such criticism by Lawrence Kohlberg, a leading proponent of cognitive moral theory. Also discussed are the findings of Walker (1982), who investigated sex differences in moral reasoning by conducting a literature review of 54 studies employing the Moral Judgment Interview and 24 studies employing the Defining Issues Test. A review of Nunner-Winkler's critique of Gilligan and the response of Kohlberg et al. is presented to illustrate that cognitive moralists have listened to the critique. A summary discusses the overall sufficiency of Kohlberg's response to criticism of sex bias in cognitive moral theory and notes problems remaining in the area of sex differences in moral behavior and moral development. (Author/NB)