The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is empowered with a delicate balance of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, putting the Commission in a vulnerable position whenever its decisions are reviewed. This paper takes the position that a "super-regulatory" title is unjustified when applied to the legally sanctioned role assumed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court that reviews the FCC's decisions. In support of that position, the paper reviews the origin, growth, and current status of the relationship between the FCC and the Court of Appeals, provides arguments supporting judicial prescription of telecommunication policy, and analyzes suggestions for restructuring the administrative/judicial apparatus for communication regulation. The vague "public interest" mandate wielded by the FCC is noted as the source of the FCC's vulnerability; however it is concluded that the Court of Appeals, rather than taking advantage of that vulnerability, has insured that every interpretation of "public interest" be carefully considered. In this way, reasonable, if not expert, judgment prevails in communications policymaking decisions. (RL)