To what extent, if any, will workers in families receiving Government cash benefits reduce their hours of work? The papers by Irwin Garfinkel and by Glen Cain and Harold Watts review large numbers of studies on this question. These authors caution us against having great confidence in the detailed estimates of how workers will respond because limitations exist in all the studies. On the other hand, the reviews do give reliable guidance about the direction and order of magnitude of likely effects. According to most of the studies, one would expect prime age married men not to alter significantly their pattern of work in response to the availability of an expanded income supplement program. There is also general agreement that increasing income guarantees or benefit-loss rates would cause a moderate reduction in hours of work (in market jobs, not necessarily in the home) among married women, female family heads, and older men. In his paper, Samuel Rea, Jr. compares more than 20 negative income tax, wage subsidy, and earnings subsidy proposals. Rea uses one set of estimated relationships that specify how a beneficiary's hours of work depend on his wage rate, unearned income (pensions, rents, dividends), and those feature of income maintenance programs that influence his net wage rate and unearned income. Given predictions of worker response and data representative of the national population in 1966, Rea is able to examine how specific program changes affect budget costs, hours of work, and the share of benefits going to the lowest income groups. (Author/JM)