We study supply-side responses to student financial aid, focusing on how tuition responds to the targeting of aid. Our framework identifies two mechanisms: a direct effect, which raises tuition, and a composition effect, which can lower tuition if aid targets price-sensitive students. Leveraging a reform in Brazil's student loan program, we provide descriptive evidence that both mechanisms are quantitatively important. We then estimate an equilibrium model of higher education to quantify the impact of alternative targeting schemes. We find that a loan program with merit-based targeting increases tuition by 3%, while need-based targeting raises tuition by only 0.4%. This difference arises because low-income students--targeted under the need-based scheme--are more price-sensitive. These price adjustments have a strong impact on enrollment decisions, emphasizing the importance of targeting in student financial aid policy design. [Financial support for this report was received from the Stanford King Center on Global Development, the Stanford Center for Computational Social Sciences, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), the Haley-Shaw Dissertation Fellowship, the NAEd/Spencer Dissertation Fellowship Program, and the Georgetown Center for Economic Research (GCER).]