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Murphy, Peter – Journal of Moral Education, 2014
What does current empirically informed moral psychology imply about the goals that can be realistically achieved in college-level applied ethics courses? This paper takes up this question from the vantage point of Jonathan Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model of human moral judgment. I summarize Haidt's model, and then consider a variety of…
Descriptors: Ethics, Teaching Methods, Moral Values, Intuition
Haste, Helen – Journal of Moral Education, 2013
Moral Foundations research offers rich promise, opening up key questions about how affect and cognition are integrated in moral response, and exploring how different moral discourses may supply meaning and valence to moral experience. Haidt and his colleagues also associate different discourses with different political positions. However I address…
Descriptors: Moral Values, Affective Behavior, Schemata (Cognition), Models
Kasachkoff, Tziporah; Salzstein, Hebert D. – European Journal of Developmental Science, 2008
The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral reasoning proposed by Jon Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2006) is criticized on the grounds that (1) its conclusions concerning moral reasoning are unwarranted by research reporting 'dumbfounded' responses by subjects whose initial judgments are challenged and judgments…
Descriptors: Moral Development, Moral Values, Abstract Reasoning, Decision Making
Musschenga, Albert W. – Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2009
In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is…
Descriptors: Ethical Instruction, Moral Values, Moral Development, Values Education

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