Reasserts view that there can be emotional or affective arousal without prior cognitive appraisal. Criticizes Lazarus's rejection of this view on the grounds that it presents no empirical evidence, is based on an arbitrary definition of emotion, and obliterates all distinctions between cognition, sensation, and perception. (CMG)

Responds to Zajonc's criticism of author's own belief in primacy of cognition by defining what he means by "emotion" and discussing whether sensory preferences can be regarded as emotions. Says that the evidence Zajonc presents to supporting his claim for the primacy of emotion and its independence from cognition is specious. (CMG)

Connectionistic notions of hemispheric specialization and use are incompatible with the network organization of the human brain. Although brain organization has correspondence with phenomena at more complex levels of analysis, the correspondence is not categorical in nature, as has been claimed by the left-brain/right-brain theorists. (Author/GC)

Presents a theory which attempts to incorporate phenomenological views on the self-concept within an objective framework: the self-concept is identified as a self-theory. (Author/JM)