Developmentalists have overlooked the problem of the real impermanence of things. Though the metaphor of impermanence is central to Piagetian and neo-nativist accounts of representation, the development of the understanding of impermanence is unstudied. This article proposes that the development of the concept of impermanence is distinct from the…

Three experiments test object permanenece in 3 1/2- and 4 1/2-month-old infants, and use an impossible-possible-habituation event format. The 4 1/2-month-olds, and the 3 1/2-month-olds who were fast habituators, look reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event. Results seriously question Piaget's (1954) claims regarding the age at…

Suggests that Greenberg's challenge to the centrality of object permanence in developmental thinking reveals that developmentalists' theories about childhood speak about their own self-images. Notes that developmentalists have been guilty of not only the object permanence fallacy but also the genetic fallacy, or the mistaken belief that describing…

Maintains that Muller and Overton (1998) misrepresent her theory of infant concept formation in infancy, makes corrections to their representation, and notes that her theory was developed in part because of the lack of detailed mechanisms in Piaget's theory to account for concept formation. Argues that Muller and Overton's proposed alternative…

Examines development of representational thought from the perspective of Jean Mandler's image-schema theory and an action-theoretical approach derived from Piaget's theory. Concludes that empirical findings fail to support hypotheses of early onset, and that representational development is more adequately interpreted within the context of an…

Observed the reactions of 3.5-month-old infants looking at a carrot that should have but did not appear in a window after passing behind a screen. The results of this and several similar experiments indicated that 3.5-month-old infants are able to represent and reason about hidden objects. (BC)