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Peer reviewedJohnson-Laird, P. N.; Legrenzi, Paolo; Girotto, Vittorio; Legrenzi, Maria Sonino; Caverni, Jean-Paul – Psychological Review, 1999
Outlines a theory of naive probability in which individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an "extensional" way. The theory accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem.…
Descriptors: Beliefs, Critical Thinking, Intuition, Probability
Peer reviewedTversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel – Psychological Review, 1983
Judgments under uncertainty are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule of probability. Representativeness and availability heuristics can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. Alternative interpretations of this conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it…
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, Error Patterns, Evaluative Thinking, Heuristics
