In Aristotelian virtue theories, "phronesis" is foundational to being good, but to date accounts of how this particularly important virtue can emerge are sketchy. This article plumbs recent thinking in Aristotelian virtue ethics and developmental theorizing to explore how far its emergence can be understood developmentally, i.e., in…

This paper presents an autobiographical narrative of two aspects of my history; two events that permeated my moral consciousness and influenced my political development and a sequence of changes in my dominant theoretical and epistemological perspectives. The two events were, as a teenager, the intense experience of briefly witnessing Apartheid…

This essay comments on articles comprising a "Journal of Moral Education" Special Issue (September, 2008, 37[3]). The issue was intended to honour the 50th anniversary of Lawrence Kohlberg's doctoral dissertation and his subsequent impact on the field of moral development and education. The articles were characterised by the Issue editor (Don…

The argument of this paper focuses on the relationship between cognitive structures and structures of interaction. It contends that there is still a place in moral development theory and research for a concept of moral stages. The thesis, in short, is that moral stages are not structures of thought. They are structures of action encoded in…

Is "development" a concept that properly belongs to mind and morality and, if it does, what account can we give of moral development now that Piagetian and Kohlbergian models are increasingly being abandoned in developmental psychology? In addressing this central issue, it is hoped that the paper will contribute to the quest for a new integrated…

Kohlberg's system of moral judgment development has some important links with Piaget's work on moral judgment. The ways in which Kohlberg extends or departs from Piaget's system of moral growth are examined. (Editor/RK)

This article was intended to show some of the links between Kohlberg's and McPhail's theories of moral education, one based his theories on the cognitive-developmental approach, the other on the social learning theory. As well, some comments on the Lifeline programme were offered. (Author/RK)

Comprehension of moral reasoning is important both for successful moral education and for Kohlbergian claims that moral reasoning development is cognitive in nature. Because a psychometrically appropriate moral comprehension instrument does not appear to exist, the Moral Comprehension Questionnaire (MCQ) was constructed in Study 1 and displayed…

In this paper, I argue that it is quite useful, both theoretically and empirically, to adopt a socio-cultural approach to the study of moral development. This entails viewing "moral functioning" as a form of mediated action, and moral development as the process by which persons gradually appropriate a variety of "moral mediational means". Mediated…

This paper reports a study designed to increase the moral reasoning and multicultural competence of White students in a counselling internship. An intervention was conducted to determine the effectiveness of using a deliberate psychological education (DPE) approach that incorporated issues of cultural competence, oppression and diversity. This…

David Carr (2002) has argued against the use of developmental theories as a basis for curriculum development in moral education. Although we find common ground with some aspects of Carr's arguments, we disagree with several of his criticisms of the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. He confuses romantic ideology (as espoused by…

Differing findings exist on how Defining Issues Test (DIT) scores relate to intelligence. Further study is needed in order to address aspects of intellect not previously considered and to address how these relationships rival studies that have compared indices of intellect with constructs similar to DIT scores. In the present study, a sample of…

Article investigated the possibility of teaching a non-sectarian morality in the multi-cultural school while benefiting Muslim, Humanist, Hindu and Jew. (Author/RK)

This paper argues that morality is essentially a matter of rational reflection and judgment and has little to do with feelings or affections. The notions of reason and justification are analyzed. Four types of feelings are defined and shown to provide inadequate bases for moral judgment. (Author/SJL)