We propose a cognitive-psychological model of linguistic intuitions about copredication statements. In copredication statements, like "The book is heavy and informative," the nominal denotes two ontologically distinct entities at the same time. This has been considered a problem for standard truth-conditional semantics. In this paper, we…

Both scientists and children make important structural discoveries, yet their computational underpinnings are not well understood. Structure discovery has previously been formalized as probabilistic inference about the right structural form--where form could be a tree, ring, chain, grid, etc. (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008). Although this approach…

This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals ("if") and disjunctions ("or"), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic…

Johnson-Laird and coworkers' Mental Model theory of propositional reasoning is shown to be somewhere in between what logicians have defined as "credulous" and "skeptical" with respect to the conclusions it draws on default reasoning problems. It is then argued that in situations where skeptical reasoning has been shown to lead to problematic…

Challenges Smolensky's theory that human intuitive/nonconscious cognitive processes can only be accurately explained in terms of subsymbolic computations in artificial neural networks. Symbolic learning models of two cognitive tasks involving nonconscious acquisition of information are presented: learning production rules and artificial finite…