People can appear inconsistent in their intuitions about sequences of repeated events. Sometimes people believe such sequences will continue (the "hot hand"), and sometimes people believe they will reverse (the "gambler's fallacy"). These contradictory intuitions can be partly explained by considering the perceived intentionality of the agent…

Several theories suggest that actions are coded for imitation in terms of mentalistic goals, or inferences about the actor's intentions, and that these goals solve the "correspondence problem" by allowing sensory input to be translated into matching motor output. We tested this intention reading hypothesis against general process accounts of…

Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes. We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control, which is implemented in task-sets that define how the task is to be performed. In consequence, those prime…

Argues that accounting for introspection within a theory of consciousness can be achieved through constructing information- processing models that account for "Type-C" processes in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. Suggests that the Shallice (1988) framework provides an initial account of Type-C…