In situations where an agent unintentionally causes harm to a victim, the agent's (harmless) intention typically carries "more" weight than his/her (harmful) causal role. Therefore, healthy adults typically judge leniently agents responsible for an accident. Using animated cartoons, we show, however, that in the presence of a difficult concurrent…

Prospective memory (PM) involves forming intentions, retaining those intentions, and later executing those intended responses at the appropriate time. Few studies have investigated this capacity in animals. Monkeys performed a computerized task that assessed their ability to remember to make a particular response if they observed a PM cue embedded…

Visual exploration is driven by two main factors--the stimuli in our environment, and our own individual interests and intentions. Research investigating these two aspects of attentional guidance has focused almost exclusively on factors common across individuals. The present study took a different tack, and examined the role played by individual…

People can appear inconsistent in their intuitions about sequences of repeated events. Sometimes people believe such sequences will continue (the "hot hand"), and sometimes people believe they will reverse (the "gambler's fallacy"). These contradictory intuitions can be partly explained by considering the perceived intentionality of the agent…

Body movement provides a rich source of cues about other people's goals and intentions. In the present research, we investigate how well people can distinguish between different social intentions on the basis of movement information. Participants observed a model reaching toward and grasping a wooden block with the intent to cooperate with a…

We investigate non-verbal communication through expressive body movement and musical sound, to reveal higher cognitive processes involved in the integration of emotion from multiple sensory modalities. Participants heard, saw, or both heard and saw recordings of a Stravinsky solo clarinet piece, performed with three distinct expressive styles:…

Participants learned about novel artifacts that were created for function X, but later used for function Y. When asked to rate the extent to which X and Y were a given artifact's function, participants consistently rated X higher than Y. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were also asked to rate artifacts' efficiency to perform X and Y. This…

Several theories suggest that actions are coded for imitation in terms of mentalistic goals, or inferences about the actor's intentions, and that these goals solve the "correspondence problem" by allowing sensory input to be translated into matching motor output. We tested this intention reading hypothesis against general process accounts of…

Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes. We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control, which is implemented in task-sets that define how the task is to be performed. In consequence, those prime…

In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator's intention in naming and what's really what. "Cognition, 105," 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of…

Daily experience is filled with objects that have been created by humans to serve specific purposes. For such objects, the very act of creation may be a key element of how people understand them. But exactly how does creator's intention matter? We evaluated its contribution to two forms of categorization: the name selected for an artifact, and…

Claims that people determine whether something is a member of a given artifact kind by inferring that it was successfully created with the intention that it belong to that kind. Discusses function-based and intentional-historical accounts of artifact concepts. Concludes that a rich set of inferential capacities is needed to constitute a theory of…

Argues that accounting for introspection within a theory of consciousness can be achieved through constructing information- processing models that account for "Type-C" processes in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. Suggests that the Shallice (1988) framework provides an initial account of Type-C…